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Summary
The advent of the Paris Agreement is both a 
chance as well as a challenge for international 
carbon markets. It is a chance because it has 
opened a window of opportunity for the devel-
opment of new market-based instruments as 
well as providing a framework for the incorpo-
ration of national and regional carbon crediting 
schemes that have been developed outside the 
margins of the UNFCCC in recent years. It is a 
challenge because its architecture fundamen-
tally differs from the Kyoto Protocol and the ar-
chitecture of the latter has defined the interna-
tional context in which all existing instruments 
have emerged. The main difference is the dis-
appearance of the clear differentiation between 
developing and developed countries. Under 
the Kyoto Protocol, only the developed coun-
tries faced formal mitigation obligations. Under 
the Paris Agreement, now all countries are 
obliged to develop and communicate national-
ly determined contributions, but there is no ob-
ligation to actually achieve the set goals.  
This Policy Brief sets out to investigate the na-
ture of the challenge for one specific segment 
of the global carbon market: the voluntary car-
bon market. In a first step, the container term 
“voluntary carbon market” is broken down. In
fact, the clear cut distinction between voluntary 
market and compliance market does not longer 
hold. Instead we suggest to differentiate on the 
supply side between certification schemes with 
or without international oversight. The demand 
side can be differentiated along two dimen-
sions: (1) voluntary demand vs. demand in-
duced by legal obligations (compliance) and (2) 
public vs. private demand.
In the subsequent section, the state and play of 
the voluntary carbon market is sketched out fo-
cussing on private certification schemes with-
out international oversight as well as voluntary 
demand from both public and private buyers.
Next, the change in the architecture of the 
global climate regime outlined above is de-
scribed in more detail before the implications 
for the voluntary market (again focus on supply 
without oversight for voluntary buyers) are 
identified.
We find that the voluntary market must prepare
to become part of the Paris architecture if wants 
to remain credible. Voluntary certification 
schemes will have to make sure that Parties re-
port on the certificates transferred or set up an 
international registry that allows to track these 
transfers. Alternatively, suppliers of the volun-
tary markets could shift their business models 
from providing an offset scheme to a labelling 
scheme in which high-quality mitigation activi-
ties are certified including a quantification of 
the achieved emission reductions, but these 
could not be used to consolidate the emissions 
account of whoever purchases the certificates.
All things considered, the new horizon of inter-
national climate policy under the Paris Agree-
ment imposes a serious identity crisis for the 
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1 Introduction  
Human-made climate change is accelerating. 
2015 was the hottest year on record with global 
mean temperatures around 1 °C above pre-
industrial levels. Thus far, 2016 was even hotter,
breaking each and every monthly record. In 
fact, August 2016 was the 15th subsequent rec-
ord breaking month (NOAA, 2016).
Fortunately, 2015 was also ground-breaking in
terms of the political response to this develop-
ment. In Paris, the states of the world finally 
agreed to a new and comprehensive climate 
change agreement. The Paris Agreement to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) establishes a new uni-
versal legal framework and obligates all coun-
tries to develop and communicate so-called 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in
which they formulate their climate change mit-
igation and adaptation goals as well as indicate 
policies and measures to attain them.
The Paris Agreement is the result of a long and 
intensive negotiation process. At the annual
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali, 2007, 
Parties had agreed to negotiate a new climate 
change agreement to complement (or succeed) 
the Kyoto Protocol. (In)famously, the first at-
tempt to seal such an agreement failed disas-
trously in Copenhagen 2009 (Grubb, 2010).
While progress on the multilateral negotiation
process was painstakingly slow, carbon pricing 
initiatives mushroomed all over the planet 
(World Bank, 2016). Private actors played a key 
role in this development including by increas-
ingly reverting to voluntary carbon credit
schemes to compensate their emissions.  
This ecosystem of voluntary carbon trading 
emerged in the legal environment of the Kyoto 
Protocol, in which developed countries face 
quantified emission limitation and reduction 
obligations (QELROs) while developing coun-
tries not listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC have 
no such obligations. The legal structure now 
promulgated in the Paris Agreement is funda-
mentally different: it is universal as it formulates 
obligations for all states to reduce emissions, 
yet the attainment of the pledged contributions 
is not compulsory. This is a challenge also to the 
voluntary carbon market as it has to rethink its 
role and its interdependence with the formal 
climate change mitigation efforts of national
governments, including the questions if and 
how voluntary activities are reported.
This Policy Brief outlines this challenge in some
detail. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to 
the voluntary carbon market, its status, and re-
cent developments. Section 3 juxtaposes the 
architecture of the Paris Agreement to its pre-
decessor, the Kyoto Protocol, in order to identi-
fy the specific challenges for voluntary carbon 
trading. Section 4 identifies potential avenues 
to address these challenges (at least some of 
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2 The Voluntary Carbon 
Market – An Overview
2.1 A Fragmented Global  
Carbon Market 
Before going into the details of the voluntary 
carbon markets it is worthwhile to clarify what 
the “voluntary carbon market” actually is and 
how it has co-evolved with so-called “compli-
ance markets”.  
Originally, the voluntary carbon market was 
commonly defined in contrast to the compli-
ance market: the voluntary market, without any 
international oversight, consists of privately or-
ganized carbon crediting schemes who supply 
mitigation units to private buyers – corpora-
tions or individuals – that want to compensate 
their carbon footprint for ethical reasons or rea-
sons of corporate social responsibility, whereas 
on the compliance market supply was generat-
ed by international mechanisms (CDM and JI) 
and demand was driven by national mitigation 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol or, as a 
derivative thereof, by private corporations 
regulated under the EU ETS. In recent years,
though, the global carbon market has seen 
considerable fragmentation. The black and 
white definition of voluntary vs. compliance 
carbon market is no longer meaningful as vari-
ous shades of grey have emerged. For example: 
•  nation states have bought carbon units 
above and beyond their Kyoto obligations; 
•  carbon crediting schemes are being used to 
disperse international climate finance 
•  carbon units issued by the VCS and other 
privately organized schemes have been 
proposed to be eligible under the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation’s (ICAO) upcoming 
mandatory offset scheme.
In this section we thus try to capture the full 
spectrum of the global carbon market and in-
troduce categories that help to describe the 
various segments of the market more accurate-
ly than the binary distinction of voluntary vs.
compliance markets (see also figure 1 below).  
2.1.1 Supply Side 
On the supply side, it is not very helpful to dis-
tinguish between voluntary and compliance 
standards. Instead, we propose to separate car-
bon standards with and without out interna-
tional oversight and certification standards with 
international oversight continues. Traditionally,
the former served voluntary demand while the 
latter served primarily demand from entities 
with legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol
or dependent emissions trading schemes. 
Meanwhile, supply without international over-
sight includes both privately organized as well
as state-run schemes. The privately organized 
standards include the Verified Carbon Standard 
(VCS), the Gold Standard, the Climate Action 
Reserve, the American Carbon Registry and Plan 
Vivo. More recently, the Japanese government 
has begun to develop its own crediting mecha-
nism, the Joint Crediting Mechanism, which it
also intends to use under the Paris Agreement. 
Another example for a state-run or at least pub-














































Mechanisms with international oversight 
• Clean Development Mechanism
• Joint Implementation
• International Emissions Trading under Article
17 Kyoto Protocol








Countries with quantified emission limita-
tion and reduction obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol
Countries with legally binding contribu-
tions under the Paris Agreement
Entities under national/regional emis
sions trading schemes (incl. EU ETS)
Aviation sector under a prospective global
market based mechanism (GMBM) under
ICAO
Mechanisms without international oversight
• VCS
• Gold Standard
• Climate Action Reserve?
• American Carbon Registry?
• Plan Vivo
• Japanese Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)






y Countries without legally binding contri-
butions under the Paris Agreement 
Countries buying and retiring carbon cred
its beyond their obligation.
Companies buying credits for reasons of
corporate social responsibility
Individuals or companies compensating
for example air travel or events.
Identity Crisis? – Voluntary Carbon Crediting and the Paris Agreement 
-
-
Figure 1: Categorization of the segments of international carbon markets. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
The only project-based mechanisms with inter-
national oversight are the flexible mechanisms
of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 
(JI). They continue to exist, but have recently 
faced serious issues. Historically, the EU ETS has 
been the biggest source of demand (see be-
low). However, the demand for Certified Emis-
sion Reductions (CERs) from the CDM or Emis-
sion Reduction Units (ERUs) from JI collapsed 
after the economic crisis hit the EU and resulted 
in a dramatic oversupply of emission allowanc-
es in the EU ETS (Bellassen, Stephan, & Leguet,
2012; Hermwille, 2013). Consequently, carbon 
prices collapsed and also the project pipeline of 
the two project-based mechanisms came to a 
virtual standstill. In fact, some CDM projects re-
verted to voluntary buyers as a lifeline during 
these times of market crisis (World Bank, 2016, 
p. 33).
In the Paris Agreement, a new mechanism was 
defined. Article 6.4 establishes a mechanism “to 
contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and support sustainable develop-
ment” (UNFCCC, 2016, Art. 6.4). A work pro-
gramme has been devised to develop modali-
ties and procedures for this mechanism. Once 
operational, this new mechanism will, like the 
CDM, work under the oversight of an interna-
tional governance body.  
Somewhat on the borderline between the two 
sources of supply fall any potential “cooperative 
approaches” under Article 6.2 of the Paris 
Agreement. This article allows countries to di-
rectly cooperate. Formal international oversight 
in terms of common rules, modalities and pro-
cedures will not be established. Yet a work pro-
gramme to develop “guidance” was initiated 
under the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scien-
tific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) will be 
provided.
2.1.2 Demand Side 
On the demand side, the situation is even more 
complex. The sources of demand can be cate-
gorised along at least two dimensions. (1) Buy-
ers can be private corporations or individuals or 
they can be public, i.e. national governments.
And (2) buyers can use carbon credits in order 
to fulfil legal obligations (compliance) or volun-
tarily. 
Legal obligations for national governments can 
originate from international agreements, the 
Kyoto Protocol and to some extent the Paris 
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For the private sector these obligations origi-
nate from national (or regional) legislation. For 
example, companies from the European power 
sector and most heavy industries are obliged 
under the EU ETS to surrender one emission al-
lowance for every tonne of CO2 they emit. In-
ternational credits such as ERUs and CERs can 
be used to substitute such allowances (at least 
to some extent). Another option is the use of 
(international) carbon credits under carbon tax 
schemes. In some countries, companies pay a 
fixed tax rate on every tonne emitted. In some 
cases, carbon credits can be used to reduce the 
tax burden.
Another potential source of demand for inter-
national carbon credits is the international avia-
tion sector. To date, the aviation industry is one 
of the largest sources of voluntary demand.
Service providers such as atmosfair, myclimate, 
and others offer easily accessible compensation 
of air travel emissions for individual and corpo-
rate customers. However, offsetting of emis-
sions will become mandatory in the future. Al-
ready in 2010 the ICAO has agreed to limit the 
growth of net emissions from 2020 onwards. A 
Carbon ‘Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA)’ has been cre-
ated to support this goal (ICAO, 2016; see also 
Hermwille, 2016). It is still unclear which types 
of carbon credits will be eligible under the 
scheme, though. In the past, the aviation indus-
try had strongly lobbied to include all sorts of 
credits including those from certification stand-
ards without international oversight 
(Hermwille, 2016). 
For private buyers, purchasing carbon credits 
without any formal obligations would typically
mean that they intend to compensate their 
own emissions for ethical or corporate social 
responsibility reasons. Furthermore, pre-
compliance demand plays a supporting role in
many of the voluntary transactions. Here pri-
vate actors anticipating future regulation buy 
credits to compensate part of their emissions 
(Hamrick & Goldstein, 2016). With the dynamic 
and open-ended structure of the Paris Agree-
ment and its 5-yearly contribution cycles (see 
below), this becomes even more critical, as the 
voluntary demand of today may well become
mandatory in subsequent NDC cycles. 
Last but not least, national governments can 
voluntarily buy credits to support mitigation ac-
tivities beyond their formal obligations or as a 
tool for results-based finance in the context of 
development assistance or international cli-
mate finance (see table 1, below).
This discussion shows that the binary distinc-
tion between voluntary and compliance mar-
kets is an anachronism. However, most of the 
literature still uses this taxonomy. This is partic-
ularly the case for two flagship reports that are 
the basis for the subsequent analysis: the “State 
of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2016” 
(Hamrick & Goldstein, 2016) and the “State and 
Trends of Global Carbon Pricing” (World Bank,
2016). In the remainder of the Policy Brief, when 
we speak of voluntary markets, we will focus on
the supply side, more specifically on private 
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Programme
Carbon Neutral Business 
Trips of the German
Federal Government
Pilot Auctioning Facility






The German Federal Government in 2015 has decided to offset the climate impact of its 
employee’s airborne and road business trips. To date, emissions to the amount of 138,038
tonnes of CO2e have been compensated using credits from the CDM.  The German gov-
ernment decided to support CDM projects that will help to advance reform efforts under
the scheme. To date, it has purchased CERs from five projects: one project on electricity 
generation from landfill gas in Mexico, a wind power project in Costa Rica, a project for
electricity generation from crop residues in India, and two household biogas projects in 
Nepal and China. 
The scheme is purely voluntary in nature and the cancelled credits are not counted to-
wards Germany’s mitigation obligations under the Kyoto Protocol or elsewhere.
The World Bank’s Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation (PAF) 
was launched in 2013.  The PAF uses an innovative approach of buying CERs (or other
types of independently verified emission reductions) from methane projects at guaran-
teed prices by offering put options at competitive auctions. Having obtained a put, the 
successful bidder then has the right to sell their certificates to the PAF at the price set by
the auction.  The first auction was held in July 2015, with puts worth some 8.7 million CERs
being issued at a price of USD 2.40 per CER. The second round of auctions allocated USD 
20 Million to 5.7 million CERs.  
The PAF was set up to disburse a total of USD 100 million in climate finance. In a first round
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States have contributed a total of USD 53
million already. By adopting this innovative financing approach, the World Bank hopes to
provide assistance for a vast number of projects and mobilise efforts for continued abate-
ment of methane.
The Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) was launched in December 2011. Its aim is
to build capacity and develop tools and methodologies for leveraging climate finance in 
the worlds poorest countries primarily with a view to establishing energy access projects. 
Ci-Dev utilizes the CDM toolbox, i.e. its methodologies and the verification process, as a 
means to provide performance-based payments for development projects. The initiatives 
incentivizes the development of standardized sectoral baselines and the establishment of
accounting standards for “suppressed demand”. In very deprived and marginalized situa-
tions people often lack the economic ability to satisfy very basic human needs. The con-
cept of suppressed demand takes this into account and allows to use carbon finance to
help achieve a minimum service level for lighting, cooking or other types of basic de-
mands.
Table 1: Three examples for voluntary demand from the public sector, i.e. demand that exceeds national mitigation
obligations under international law.
2.2  Status of Voluntary Carbon 
Supply 
Historically, the market for carbon units under 
international standards (CDM & JI) has dwarfed 
the voluntary carbon markets (supplied by pri-
vate standards) (see figure 2, below). Only in re-
cent years, after CER prices collapsed, has vol-
untary supply gained shares.
In 2015, a total 84.1 million tonnes of CO2e 
were bought for voluntary purposes on interna-
tional markets. This is an increase of 10 per cent 
against 2014 levels. However, due to falling av-
erage prices, the total market value fell by 7 per 
cent to USD 278 million. A total of carbon cred-
its to the amount of 42 million tonnes of CO2e 
were issued in 2015 and 39.5 million credits 
were retired. Cumulatively, privately organized 
carbon schemes have credited emission reduc-
tions of 329.8 million tonnes CO2e, nearly half 
of which have been retired (Hamrick & 
Goldstein, 2016).
The lion’s share of these emission reductions 
has been certified by the California based Veri-
fied Carbon Standard (VCS) who accounted for 
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Figure 2: Annual and cumulative CER and ERU issuance, secondary CER prices (left), and voluntary offset issuance and 
prices (right). Source: World Bank (2016).
Next in line are the Climate Action Reserve 
(CAR) and the Gold Standard both with ~20 per 
cent of the market. The American Carbon Regis-
try (ACR) accounts for 5.6 per cent. The smallest 
certification scheme in terms of contracted 
emission reductions is Plan Vivo (below 2 per 
cent) (see figure 3).
Due to the extremely low demand for CERs for 
compliance, the UNFCCC Secretariat has set up 
a platform for voluntary cancelation of credits 
from the CDM. The “Climate Neutral Now” initi-
ative was launched in September 2015. The 
turnout has been, however, relatively low so far.
Less than one per cent of total cancellations of 
CERs were made through this voluntary scheme
(World Bank, 2016). Compared to the private 
certification standards, this voluntary use of the 
CDM is miniscule, a mere 1.9 per cent of all 
transactions on the voluntary market (Hamrick 
& Goldstein, 2016).
With respect to the types of mitigation activities 
that are certified, the majority of the projects 
are wind power projects, followed by projects 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD+), and methane 
emissions from waste treatment in landfills. Col-
lectively these three project types account for 
more than two thirds of the total transacted 
volume in 2015 (see figure 4). Worth mention-
ing are also clean cookstove projects. Although 
they account only for slightly below 7 per cent 
of the traded credit volume, due to higher av-
erage prices, their market value sums up to 
nearly 10 per cent of the total (Hamrick & 
Goldstein, 2016).
In terms of the regional distribution, the majori-
ty of the traded in 2015 originated from coun-
tries without formal national climate change 
mitigation obligation (see figure 5). However, 
the distribution is very different from the re-
gional distribution of the Kyoto Protocol’s
mechanisms, CDM and JI. By far the largest 
share of traded credits originated from the 
United States. The US is not eligible under the 
CDM or JI, so voluntary certification schemes 
are the only opportunity available. Also, China,
which hosts the lion’s share of CDM projects,
ranks only eighth in voluntary supply and ac-
counts for below 5 per cent of the units traded 
in 2015. Somewhat surprising may also be that 
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reduction obligation under the Kyoto Protocol,
features in the top 10 of the host countries. 3.7 
per cent of all contracted voluntary credits orig-
inated there.
Although the voluntary supply has steadily
grown over the last years, market outlooks are 
not particularly bright. Hamrick and Goldstein 
(2016) estimate that a total of nearly 56 million 
carbon credits remain unsold in the portfolios 
of project developers and this surplus of supply 
is expected to grow even further. Unless new 
sources of demand are found, the prices on the 
voluntary markets are therefore bound to fall 
even further.
Figure 3: Share of contracted voluntary carbon credits by 
certification standard. Source: Wuppertal Institute based on 
Hamrick and Goldstein (2016). 
 
Figure 4: Share of contracted voluntary carbon credits by 
project type. Source: Wuppertal Institute based on Hamrick 
















Figure 5: Share of contracted voluntary carbon credits by 
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3Challenges for Voluntary  
Standards après Paris  
3.1 The Architecture of the Paris 
Agreement vs. the Kyoto 
Protocol 
In December 2015, the Parties to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) adopted a new and encom-
passing climate change treaty: the Paris 
Agreement. For the first time, this Agreement 
obligates all countries to act on human-made 
climate change. All signatories must develop 
and communicate so-called Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions (NDCs) in which they set 
themselves climate change mitigation and ad-
aptation goals and/or collate policies and 
measures intended to achieve these goals.
In this, the Paris Agreement fundamentally dif-
fers from the Kyoto Protocol. (1) the climate 
change commitments are not negotiated and 
agreed upon at the international level, but in-
dependently in the national capitals. And (2) 
under the Paris Agreement all Parties are to 
adopt national mitigation targets. The Kyoto 
Protocol, by contrast, formulated so-called 
“quantified emission limitation and reduction 
obligations” (QELROs) only for developed coun-
tries included in the UNFCCCs Annex I. Devel-
oping countries (Non-Annex I) did not take on 
commitments above and beyond the very ge-
neric duties specified in Article 4 of the original 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(United Nations, 1992).
The architecture of the Kyoto Protocol is there-
fore characterized by a “capped” and an “un-
capped” environment. The former comprises all 
Annex I countries. Their QELROs define a fixed 
amount of emissions that has been assigned to 
every country. While the Kyoto Protocol al-
lowed countries with QELROs to trade parts of 
their assigned amounts, either directly or 
through Joint Implementation1 the total emis-
sion budget is still capped. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, non-Annex I coun-
tries have no obligation to limit their emissions 
and hence no assigned amount. The CDM al-
lowed to certify mitigation projects in this un-
capped environment. For every verified emis-
sion reduction of a tonne of CO2e, one CER can 
be issued, transferred to another country and 
counted towards meeting that party’s QELRO.
The Paris Agreement’s architecture differs fun-
damentally from this in a number of ways: First,
the Paris Agreement does away with the formal 
and static differentiation between developed 
and developing countries, between countries 
with mitigation obligations and countries with-
out such obligations. “As nationally determined 
contributions to the global response to climate 
change, all Parties are to undertake and com-
municate ambitious efforts (...)“ (UNFCCC, 2016, 
Art. 3). In fact overcoming  the deeply en-
trenched chasm between developed and de-
veloping countries was key to the successful
 
1 Joint Implementation is one of the two project-based 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. Mitigation projects in 
Annex I projects can be registered and issued Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) for every abated tonne of CO2e 
emission. The ERUs are subtracted from the projects’ host 
country’s assigned amount and can be transferred to an-
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adoption of the Paris Agreement (cf. Obergassel
et al., 2015).
Second, the legal character of the national cli-
mate goals differs between the two treaties. 
The Kyoto Protocol’s QELROs oblige those 
states to actually achieve the set mitigation 
goals. Contrastingly, the Paris Agreement does 
not promulgate such obligations with respect 
to the mitigation goals set out in the NDCs. In-
stead, it establishes a compulsory political pro-
cess of formulating NDCs, implementing poli-
cies to achieve them and subject the progress 
to international review through an international
transparency mechanism (Bodansky, 2016;
Obergassel et al., 2015; Rajamani, 2016).
Under the Kyoto Protocol, carbon credits could 
be “mined” in countries without mitigation ob-
ligations. The host countries did not have any 
interest in attributing the realized emission re-
ductions to their national climate policies and 
including them in their own GHG inventories.
However, they had an interest in attracting in-
vestments in low-carbon technologies from in-
dustrialized countries. Both the CDM as well as 
various voluntary carbon standards helped to 
channel such investments.
This situation has fundamentally changed un-
der the Paris Agreement: former host countries 
without mitigation commitments now face an 
obligation to reduce emissions themselves.
They therefore have an incentive to keep as 
many emission reductions as possible in their 
own books. This is particularly true for low cost 
emission reduction potentials.
Of course not all countries have formulated 
their NDCs in terms of absolute GHG emission 
reductions / limitations or GHG intensity tar-
gets. Of 187 countries that have submitted their 
NDCs2, 153 countries have indicated GHG tar-
gets. Of the remaining 34, the majority (23) only 
 
2 The EU has submitted a joint NDC for all its member 
states. 
formulated actions without quantified targets,
7 combined a quantified non-GHG target with
actions and only 4 specify a quantified goal that 
is not expressed in GHG terms. Also some coun-
tries have limited their NDCs to some sectors 
and excluded others. Roughly one third of the 
NDCs that specify a GHG target limit this target
to a subset of their economy, 12 countries have 
economy-wide targets excluding only the land 
use and forestry sector, and 8 countries did not 
specify the sectoral scope of their target. All 
major emitters have expressed their climate 
change mitigation contributions in GHG, the 
majority with economy-wide scope. The only
exemptions are India and China who did not 
specify the sectoral scope of their targets (WRI, 
2016) (see figure 6, next page).
Theoretically, the “mining” of carbon credits 
could therefore be continued in those sectors 
that fall outside the scope of what is covered by 
the NDCs. However, the remaining “mining 
claim” is much reduced.  
3.2 Tracking of Units 
For the vast majority of mitigation potentials, 
voluntary carbon standards face a serious chal-
lenge. Either they could continue to certify pro-
jects without formal acknowledgement and 
recognition of the host country. Any emission 
reduction achieved under the scope of a coun-
tries NDC would materialize in the host coun-
try’s GHG inventory, provided the inventory’s
methodologies are of sufficient accuracy and 
granularity, and contribute to the attainment of 
that country’s mitigation goal. Therefore, trans-
ferring carbon credits from projects without a 
formal recognition in the host country’s GHG 
balance sheet, would necessarily result in dou-
ble counting. Emission reductions would be 
claimed by a private entity that ends up buying 
the voluntary credits and by the host country of 
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Figure 6: Overview of contribution types and sectoral scope of nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
Source: Wuppertal Institute based on WRI (2016).
One solution would be to devise a system that 
allows to transparently track and account trans-
ferred carbon credits. Under such a registry, it
would be theoretically possible to balance the 
accounts of the host country of the activity and 
the country of residence of the entity that pur-
chases and ultimately retires the credit. Such a 
registry would work most effectively and most 
economically centrally organized and under in-
ternational oversight. Arguably, it would ex-
ceed the capacity of any single (private) certifi-
cation body to set up such a registry. Having 
several competing registries would not only 
duplicate work and add unnecessary costs, it
could also erode the credibility of the trading
regime as a whole, particularly when compet-
ing registries try to attract customers by lower-
ing the stringency of their accounting stand-
ards. If such a system will be developed directly 
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, volun-
tary certification schemes could try to make 
their credits fungible under the international
scheme subjecting themselves to at least some
kind of international scrutiny. 
Another possibility to track transfers and ad-
dress double counting would be to require all
countries to transparently report on their ex-
ported and imported credits, including those of 
the voluntary carbon market. These reports,
which could be submitted together with the 
national inventories, would allow to double 
check all transfers. The costs associated to this 
solution might be significantly lower than the 
administrative burden of introducing a registry. 
However, both solutions will have to be imple-
mented at the international level by ensuring
equal conditions for all countries participating 
in these transfers. 
Variants of Double Counting
There are several phenomena that may lead to an inaccurate 
accounting of emission reductions that have been summa-
rized in the container term “double counting” (cf. Schneider, 
Kollmuss, & Lazarus, 2015). 
•  Double issuance occurs when more than one carbon 
unit (e.g. from competing certification schemes) is is-
sued for one and the same emission reduction. 
•  Double claiming occurs when the host country and the 
purchasing country both claim the emission reductions 
and count them towards achieving their mitigation 
goal.
•  Double use occurs when one mitigation outcome is 
used for mitigation pledge attainment more than once, 
either by the same Party or by different Parties, for ex-
ample, because certificates are indistinguishable due to 
lack of unique serial numbers. 
•  Double purpose occurs when the mitigation outcome 
is counted towards a (purchasing) country’s mitigation 
commitment and at the same time the financial flow
associated with the project is counted towards the in-
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3.3 Changing Focus 
Another potential route for voluntary standards 
is discussed inter alia by the Gold Standard
Foundation. One solution would be to shift 
away from supplying “offsets” to labelling miti-
gation projects. Currently, the good traded on 
the voluntary carbon market is expressed in
terms of “avoided carbon emissions”. This al-
lows end buyers to settle their own emission 
accounts, taking the sum of their own internal
emissions and emissions avoided externally.
Instead, voluntary standards could take a step 
back. Instead of certifying emission reductions 
they could certify the support of a specific miti-
gation activity. In fact the concept of certified 
emission reduction in and of itself is a rather 
abstract one given that it commodifies some-
thing that never existed. Changing the focus of 
what is certified could be a way forward. This 
would allow to avoid the issue of the attribution 
of the mitigation outcome to either the pur-
chaser of the certificate or the host country in 
that the emission reduction occurs. The result-
ing emission cuts would in any case be at-
tributed to the host country and be rightfully
reflected in its GHG inventory. The buyer of the 
certificate could still claim that she supported a 
mitigation project that resulted in emission re-
ductions of a quantified amount. The only dif-
ference would be that the buyer has to main-
tain two separate accounts, its own emissions 
and emission reductions supported elsewhere.
It would not be allowed to consolidate and liq-
uidate both as one account. In practice, this
would constitute a shift from a offsetting 
scheme to a labelling scheme in which there is
no common “currency”.
Arguably, though, such a shift of focus would 
pose a serious communication challenge. For 
one, it would be relatively easy for entities pur-
chasing such a support certificate to still claim
that they have offset their own emissions. It 
would be relatively easy to make use of these 
new kind of certificates in a deceptive way, es-
pecially if the certification schemes fail to
communicate clearly the difference between 
their old standards and this new standard. 
Also, this approach cannot fully exclude double 
counting. While it avoids the issue of double 
counting of emission reductions, it may well be 
the case that industrialized countries appropri-
ate themselves on the financial flows associated 
with the supported mitigation activities and 
count them towards their climate finance 
commitments. Given these uncertainties, it is
unclear whether there is actually demand in 
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4Conclusions  
In the past, voluntary carbon markets have 
played a key role in complementing mandatory 
carbon regulation. This has led to a proliferation 
of certification standards used by private as well
as public actors for different reasons.
This policy brief shed some light on these activi-
ties and the rationale of the different actors in-
volved. Furthermore, it highlighted some key 
challenges the voluntary carbon market is con-
fronted with in the context of the Paris Agree-
ment: the new legal framework introduced with 
the Paris Agreement which requires climate ac-
tion to be taken by all parties modifies the way 
voluntary carbon market activities must be 
thought of. The possibilities to implement cli-
mate activities in areas not covered by climate 
change regulation are significantly reduced. If
the ambition and coverage of NDCs increases 
as envisaged by the Paris Agreement, continu-
ing to focus on these activities in the uncapped 
environment is not an option.
Instead, the voluntary standards must prepare 
to become part of the Paris architecture. The 
links between voluntary market and interna-
tional climate change will become much closer. 
As the example of addressing the issue of dou-
ble counting shows, the voluntary standards 
will become much more dependent on the in-
ternational climate policy landscape: Voluntary 
certification schemes will have to make sure 
that Parties report on the certificates trans-
ferred or set up an international registry that 
allows to track these transfers.  
As shown, the alternative of certification 
schemes to change their focus by certifying the 
promotion of low-carbon development instead 
of carbon emission reductions will be difficult 
to communicate and cannot fully address the 
risk of double counting. If voluntary carbon 
markets want to remain credible, they will have 
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